Heidegger’s Opposition to Sartre

Heidegger’s critique of Sartre’s misreading of Being and Time is imparted in “Letter on Humanism” (1946), as a direct response to a letter from one of Sartre’s followers, Jean Braufret. Heidegger’s “Letter” distances himself from Sartre’s existentialism philosophically and, more importantly, questions humanism in particular because, according to Heidegger, “every humanism is either grounded in …

An Unlikely Association with Heidegger

Though any association between Martin Heidegger and posthumanism may seem unlikely, I must admit, as a disclaimer, that such an association is not obvious. In fact, perhaps, it is certainly more likely to assume that Heidegger and posthumanism have absolutely nothing in common, and that the Heidegger’s preoccupations and the posthumanist concerns are mutually exclusive. …

Sin, Alienation, and the Being of God

(Theological) Sin, as a form of alienation, can be extrapolated from Heideggerian notion of “being-in-the-world.”[1] By way of this approach, sin can, in turn, be defined as “being tempted and being tranquilized”[2] to the point that being human becomes being alienated, where “this [overriding] alienation drives [the sinner] into a kind of Being which borders …

The “Rhizome” and Dasein

In the Introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari summarize the “principal characteristics” of a rhizome as: “…connect[ing] any point to any other point, and its traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states.” Based on this, the rhizome—if it “connects any point to …

“Dasein and Temporality” in Division II of Being and Time (1927)

Division II of Being and Time begins with the header entitled “Dasein and Temporality,” announcing “the outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein,” which is oriented towards “the task of a primordial existential interpretation of [Dasein]” (274). What follows, though, is a brief review—or recapitulation—of the sum of Division I, culminating in “[an] understanding …

From Division I Chapter 5 (and Further) of Being and Time (1927)

Upon entering Chapter 5 of Division One, particularly after establishing the basic state of Dasein as “being-in-the-world,” Heidegger contends that “our first aim is to bring into relief phenomenally the unitary primordial structure of Dasein’s Being, in terms of which its possibilities and the ways for it ‘to be’ are ontologically determined.” What Heidegger’s “first …

Husserlian and Cartesian Pathmarks in Division I of Being and Time (1927)

Following Heidegger’s “Introduction,” which is meant to set up his theoretical approach to Being and Time, Heidegger presents the term “Dasein.” This special term not only has implications in the original German as “being-there,” but contains particular resonance as “human being.” In both cases, Dasein construes human existence through “being-ness,” and it is that “being-ness” …

Just a Few Thoughts on Being and Time (1927)

  Being and Time begins very appropriately with a critical assessment of Plato’s Sophist, which seems poised to position Heidegger’s investigation in the same investigative lineage as Plato. By pointing out Plato’s own admission that the expression of Being—Heidegger is aware of the elusiveness of not just the practicality of Being, but the overarching theory …

Another Note on Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/1930)

Upon entering Part One, metaphysical/comprehensive thinking, metaphysics/philosophy, and “metaphysical questioning” are pivotal to how “our fundamental task now consists in awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophizing” (59). Heidegger announces, in turn, a “coming preliminary understanding about the significance of awakening a fundamental attunement” (59) constituted on a two-fold relationship of attunement between “being-there” and …

A Note on Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/1930)

  In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude—a text from a 1929-1930 lecture course at Freiburg—after embarking on a contemporary “preliminary appraisal” of philosophy and metaphysics that sets up “the task of the course and its fundamental orientation” (1), Heidegger proceeds to awaken “a fundamental attunement” as his task, which is indicated by …